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ABSTRACT
Set in post conflict northern Uganda, this paper analyses the challenges 
facing local communities living adjacent to Murchison Falls National Park 
in Acholi land as they grapple with efforts to restore their livelihoods, in view 
of costs and losses inflicted on them by problem animals. Their return to their 
villages after 20 years of the war between insurgents of Lord’s Resistance 
Army and the government of Uganda held a lot of promise. The state 
sponsored Peace, Recovery and Development Plan; donor funded projects; 
multinational agricultural companies setting up in the area; and the tourism 
revenue sharing fund; all pointed to an empowering recovery process for the 
local community to achieve self-reliance. However, the pain of consistent 
destruction of their crops by wildlife, an unfair policy on compensation of 
damage caused by problem animals, worsened by the government refusal 
to plan with the affected communities made them feel left out. This paper 
focuses on the Tourism Revenue Sharing Fund as a tool to analyse the costs 
and losses incurred by local peasants who continue to lose their agricultural 
livelihoods but whose appeals for dialogue continue to be ignored by the 
state. Data for this paper were collected using ethnographic methods that 
included in-depth interviews of key informants, observation, as well as both 
formal and informal interactions with members of the local community in 
Pabit parish of Purongo in Acholi sub region, and government documents.
Keywords: post conflict livelihoods recovery, tourism revenue sharing fund, 
local community, participation, wildlife conservation. 
INTRODUCTION
Introduced in 1996 in Uganda, the Tourism Revenue Sharing Fund (TRSF) 
came in the wake of reforms in conservation and management of natural 
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resources commons that swept through Africa in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Although the reforms took different approaches, they largely aimed at 
addressing the threat posed by increasing competition between humans and 
wildlife for space and resources (Lamarque, Anderson, Fergusson, Lagrange, 
Osei-Owusu, and Bakker (2009), and also to address concerns about extreme 
poverty in local communities living adjacent to such resources. Thus, 
whereas in southern Africa the strategy was to strengthen community based 
conservancies where communities issued hunting licences to tourists (Bollig 
2016), in East Africa the communities were largely limited to receiving the 
tourism revenue sharing fund. The call for reforms was the outcome of the 
participatory approach to development, which had joined the mainstream as 
the new development paradigm in the 1980s (Cornwall 2000). That apart, 
the reforms had also been made necessary due to costs and losses incurred 
by local communities living close to conservation areas. The costs to the 
communities, in terms of the human-wildlife conflict analysis include, 
among other things, missed resources originally obtained from protected 
areas such as ‘bush meat’, firewood, building materials, and medicinal 
herbs that enhanced people’s livelihoods; while the losses refer to social and 
economic losses suffered whenever problem animals invade local people’s 
space and destroy their crops and livestock or cause injury to human beings. 
This study limited its focus the narratives of marginalisation in the context of 
community participation in the conservation policy, in Purongo sub county, 
Murchison Falls Conservation Area, northern Uganda. The tourism revenue 
sharing fund as manifested in the Acholi Culture and Tourism Centre 
Project in Purongo sub county served as the tool of analysis for community 
participation in conservation of wildlife and commercial tourism; and also 
in post conflict recovery of sustainable livelihoods for the region as a whole. 
THE BACKGROUND
As mentioned above, sharing revenue from commercial tourism with local 
communities living adjacent to national parks has been fronted globally 
as a key instrument for managing protected areas (Tumusiime and Vedeld 
2012, Hill 2000). The argument is that ‘sharing of tourism revenues with 
local people demonstrates the economic usefulness of protected areas and 
secures local people’s allegiance’. The approach is thus viewed as a form of 
‘hybrid environmental governance’ in which responsibility for the world’s 
biodiversity assets is shared between communities, business, NGOs, and 
States (Mill 2004); and even termed as pro-poor conservation/ tourism. But, 
as Hill (2004) argues, absence of local participation in the new approach 
has not only led to lack of locally acceptable ways of effectively reducing 
the human-wildlife conflict, but it has also contributed to feelings of being 
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marginalised among local peasants. The implication is that understanding 
the human-wildlife conflicts from farmers’ perspectives is important; as their 
beliefs are likely to influence their attitudes and behavior towards wildlife – 
whether they are going to co-exist with the wildlife or not (Hill 2000). He 
thus posits that local people’s needs and views must be taken into account 
when discussing conservation incentives, damage compensation, hunting 
alternatives and co-management; hence the need to involve them in policy 
discussions. In Purongo sub county, (adjacent to) Murchison Falls National 
Park on the northern side of River Nile, however, the participation arena 
for Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA) and the local community in wildlife 
conservation policy appears to be quite narrow. In this study, therefore, 
was trying to understand whether the outcry in the community about being 
marginalised was the outcome of the existing gap between UWA and the 
community. I analysed participation at two levels: at the UWA-community 
level; and at the level of Local Government (LG) vis-à-vis the local 
community. It is observed that in both cases was not much space opened 
for effective participation to thrive although on the surface, institutional 
mechanisms in place appeared to be adequate and effective. 
 Murchison Falls Conservation Area, in which MFNP is situated, 
is the biggest conservation area in Uganda, covering an area of 5,162 sq. 
km. It was started in 1926 on southern side of the Nile and extended across 
the river into Acholi land, on the northern side two year later. From that 
point onwards, it became illegal for local communities who had lived there 
for generations to hunt beyond the new boundary. Here, as was the case 
elsewhere in colonial territories, from 1920s onwards, game management 
was completely usurped by the (colonial) state, rendering any use of the 
resource by local communities, illegal, while permitting limited use by 
‘white officers’. Even traditional authorities who otherwise enjoyed many 
privileges were not allowed to hunt (Bollig 2016). Thus, by the stroke of 
the pen, and without compensation, whole communities were stripped of 
their right to common resources which had traditionally enhanced their 
livelihood pursuits for years. Even as the conservation area continued to 
be expanded after achieving political independence, the same (colonial) 
exclusionary ideology was maintained. The unique species of flora and 
fauna found in this conservation area such as giraffes, rhinos, elephants, and 
leopards continued to make it the favourite tourist destination for licenced 
hunters and general tourists. This meant higher revenue collections for park 
authorities. But while the income of the conservation area continued to rise, 
local communities, stripped of their rights to access natural resources in the 
park continued to wallow in abject poverty. This was the scenario until 1986 
when the insurgency against the new government of Yoweri Museveni broke 
out. During the period of the 20 years of the insurgency, tourism was one of 
the sectors in the area that were seriously affected. It was not until after the 
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ceasefire agreement of 2006 that tourism statistics on the northern side of the 
Nile started improving again. 
 
 The economic importance of the tourism sector and its 
multidimensional contribution to human wellbeing is evident worldwide in 
the wide variety of sectors to which it extends its influence and benefits. 
It is estimated that tourism contributes more than 75 million direct jobs 
worldwide (UNWTO 2012). In Uganda, the great potential of tourism to 
grow the economy is witnessed in the sector’s position among the nation’s 
investment priorities. It features among the top ten in 2014/2015 financial 
year (Uganda Budget Brief 2014). However, in spite of the impressive 
figures in the national budgets, local communities living in Purongo sub 
county adjacent to MFNP continue to suffer costs and losses associated with 
problem animals and an unresponsive governance system. Although UWA 
recently instituted measures to overcome the challenges (digging trenches to 
stop the problem animals crossing into village gardens, and recruiting youth 
as scouts to warn members of the community and park rangers whenever 
the big animals come), positive results of these measures are yet to be seen. 
Before long, the elephants backfilled the trenches, while the youth scouts 
project was still rolling out. Youth groups were being encouraged to establish 
gardens of chilli (hot pepper) to ward off elephants – the most destructive 
animals in the area. The Community officer of Murchison Falls National Park, 
when talking about the youth projects, informed that research had shown that 
elephants detest the scent of chilli. So, by planting chilli, a farmer would get 
rid of elephants without having to light a fire every night to protect his garden 
from the ‘unwanted intruders’. But some of the youth from Lagaji-A, one of 
the villages in the parish, told me that elephants still came to the village in 
spite of chilli gardens. 
 In the meantime, the local Purongo community’s call for dialogue 
with the government over their post war vulnerability and poverty linked to 
problem animals of Murchison Falls National Park remained unanswered 
(Interview Rwot Otto, the Clan Chief of the area). This was compounded 
by other issues in which the government was seen as the antagonist against 
the Acholi people in general. Talking casually with members of the local 
community about ‘the elephant problem’ in Purongo trading centre during my 
visits to the area, I soon found out that the outcry of being marginalised was 
not simply because of the wildlife policy. Three other key issues stood out 
in these casual conversations and in-depth interviews and group discussions. 
The government’s refusal to discuss the unfairness in the wildlife policy vis-
à-vis the animal raids of people’s crops was the primary one for the Purongo 
community. But it also triggered the bitter memories of Acholi cattle that were 
stolen by ‘men in uniform’ during the insurgency period. Quite a number of 
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researchers in the region highlighted the problem of cattle raids in Acholi in 
the initial stages of the war as they researched on factors that had caused the 
war (cf. Weeks 2002, Gelsdorf et al 2012, Gersony 1997, Finnstrom 2006, 
Dolan 2009). Generally, the raids were blamed on the Karamojong tribe to the 
north-east, but Acholi communities believed the government had a hand in it 
because they often saw cattle loaded on trucks heading south being escorted 
by soldiers. This convinced them the state was involved in impoverishing 
them. Thirdly, was the issue of land grabs. Although land conflicts within 
and between families and clans had become the norm in most parts of Acholi 
since the end of the insurgency, land grabbing claims against the government 
acted as a rallying cry for all. The central government decision to allocate 
1,200 hectares of land in Apaa to Madhvani Group of Companies in the 
neighbouring district of Amuru in 2007 to grow sugar cane when the ‘owners 
of the land’ were still in displacement camps (Atkinson and Owor 2013, 
Mabikke 2008) was seen as an act of sabotage against the Acholi people. 
Members of the local community were so bitter, they decided to take the 
government to court over the matter. The case has been in court since 2007. 
There is also the Lakang case where old women stripped naked at a public 
meeting to protest government attempt to grab what they said was their land 
(Lawino 2012). The government claims the land is gazetted as a wildlife 
reserve and wants the squatters on the land to relocate but the people on 
the land claim they are the bonafide owners. The border disputes between 
Amuru (Acholi) and Adjumani (Madi) over the Joka forest is another 
case where the government is again seen to be against the Acholi people. 
Government officials claim the forest is in Adjumani district. Finally, was 
the issue of corruption and mismanagement of the Peace, Recovery, and 
Development Plan (PRDP) funds for northern Uganda in the Office of the 
Prime Minister (OPM). Billions of shillings under the programme were 
either misappropriated or stolen by officers in the OPM. This also, according 
to members of the focus groups was seen as ‘sabotaging’ the recovery of the 
Acholi given that they were the most affected by the war, and therefore, the 
ones that should benefit most from the programme. The sum total of all the 
above was that when researchers and the local elite highlighted these issues, 
the Acholi community viewed themselves as second class citizens who were 
being deliberately marginalised by their own government (Alavi 2008). A 
leading Acholi politician, Norbert Mao, is quoted as saying, “We are either 
full citizens, equal to all others, or non-citizens...” (Sunday Monitor Feb., 
21 2010; New Vision, 3 May 2009). Politicians even threatened to lead the 
secession of Acholi and northerners in general from Uganda to form the Nile 
Republic.   
 Basing on the above, I observed that in spite of the 1995 national 
constitution which gives power to the people, the continued government 
168
JGD Vol. 12. Issue 2, December 2016   
169
refusal to dialogue with the Purongo community on compensation for their 
losses emanating from crop raids by problem animals, risks the dismissal of 
‘participation’ as a mere buzz word (cf. Oivier de-Sardan 2005) largely aimed 
at attracting donor funds. I thus argue that the feeling among the Acholi, 
of being marginalised, has been raised by the government’s (action and) 
inaction in its policy, programming and projects on wildlife management. 
I hence recommend the need for institutional collaboration and negotiation 
between institutions as well as between institutions and communities for a 
mutual resource management regime that benefits both the state and local 
communities (cf. Bollig 2016). It is the absence of such collaboration which 
has made the Acholi of Purongo to feel marginalised and also inhibited their 
ability to participate effectively in the post war recovery of the region. 
DATA AND METHODS
Between 2013 and 2016, I continued to visit Purongo sub county on regular 
basis. Each time I visited the area I stayed for at least one week during which I 
interacted with members of the community, and also participated in different 
activities related to the proposed cultural centre project while collecting data 
in the process. The primary data was in form of recordings and field notes 
of interviews and discussions I held with various respondents, and personal 
observation of various activities and events (Mugenda and Mugenda 2005, 
Mikkelsen 2005). I also made use of government and NGO reports, minutes 
of meetings, and other forms of documentation. In meetings, I observed the 
nature and conduct of members, including the general atmosphere in which 
the meetings were conducted. I was also able to conduct in-depth interviews 
and focus group discussions with various individuals and groups. These 
included elders, religious and cultural leaders, LG officials, and members 
from civil society organisations, among others. Often times I used these 
interviews for triangulation purposes to corroborate data I had so far received 
or observed. Data analysis mainly took the form of content and discourse 
analysis. 
‘GIVE THEM GOATS’
‘Give them goats’, which gives title to this section, sums up the resolution 
of the sub county LG on the TRSF for 2012 when Nwoya was granted 
district status. I noted that the language of the sub county LG resolution 
demonstrates a paternalistic approach, which is contrary to principles of 
participation embedded in the guidelines on the revenue sharing funds (UWA 
Guidelines on TRSF).
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 The first time local communities in Purongo received benefits of 
the fund directly was 2012 when Nwoya county acquired district status and 
officially broke away from Amuru to become Nwoya district. That was also 
the year when Purongo sub county LG used TRSF disbursements to purchase 
and distribute goats to the local communities living adjacent to the park 
instead of investing it in existing social infrastructure as had had been the 
practice. Purongo Seed Secondary School, the only government secondary 
school in the sub county, was one of the projects LG leaders in Purongo often 
mentioned with pride as an investment from TRSF. 
 However, the distribution of goats in 2012, apparently, left many 
people disgruntled; as narrated by an elderly lady in the community meeting 
in Paromo parish. The lady started by praising the government for instituting 
the fund. She believed it was a good scheme that would help the community 
to fight poverty. To her, the goats scheme was a good idea that came at the 
time people were returning to their homes after many years in IDP camps. 
But she decried the manner in which it was mishandled. No one in her area 
was given any goats. She wanted to know why. An elderly man supported her. 
He was convinced that only those with ‘big’ relatives in the LG council had 
been favoured. Sub county officials who were in the meeting endeavoured 
to explain. The entire Paromo parish did not share a border directly with the 
park and so it was not on the list of beneficiary communities. Apparently, 
community members present at the meeting understood the explanation. But 
they continued to ask why they had been left out when they too suffer the 
same problem. They said animals did not see the administrative boundaries 
between the parishes and only followed the scent of the crops they liked. 
So, why were they being discriminated? Sub county officials informed the 
Paromo community that Paromo parish was not supposed to receive revenue 
sharing fund directly; that was why they had not been given goats. But they 
were now included in the cultural centre project. So, they too would nominate 
representatives to the project committees. I noted that issues of being left out 
were not only at the macro level (between the government and Acholi), but 
they had also manifested themselves at the micro level (between the sub 
county LG and a parish). However, accusations of corruption and nepotism 
were later corroborated by the sub county LG chair. Although he did not 
cite any specific case of nepotism, he nevertheless admitted in an interview 
that the goat scheme had faced a number of challenges and that was why 
it was not continued the following year as the LG had earlier planned. He 
explained that from the sub county council point of view, the logic of giving 
out goats was to stem local poaching, which park officials had told them was 
a big problem in the area. By supplying goats, they were hoping to substitute 
‘bush meat’ with goat meat. Given that most peasants in Acholi generally 
only hunted small animals for home consumption, members in the council 
assumed that the goats would go a long way to support wildlife conservation. 
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But the goats were either ‘slaughtered for Christmas or New Year festivities, 
or to celebrate last funeral rites of their departed relatives. Within a few 
months they were gone, but poaching continued’. The council decided to 
change its approach. In 2013, they set up a small committee to explore other 
options, and the proposed cultural centre was the outcome. 
PARTICIPATION OR MARGINALISATION?
The concept of participation has a long history in Uganda dating back to 
colonial times but in the sense of people centred governance and development, 
it was first experienced in 1979 after the fall of Amin’s military regime. It 
came in form of the 10-cell system imported from Tanzania. The Uganda 
version was locally termed as ‘mayumba kumi’. Under the system, every 
ten homesteads formed a cell as the basic socio-political unit through which 
community involvement in governance and development started right from 
the grassroots. The Ugandan public, however, did not embrace the system 
readily as they associated it with socialism which they blamed for much 
of the poverty among Tanzanians at the time. And the leadership wrangles 
that cropped up between the different Ugandan factions that had united to 
overthrow Idd Amin made it worse. However, since Museveni came to power 
in 1986, the 10-cell system was substituted with Resistance Councils under 
which the village/ward became the basic unit. By the time northern Uganda 
entered the post conflict phase in 2006, and the community in Purongo 
started to receive the goats in 2012 as its share of the TRSF, participation 
had already embroiled in the mainstream by the 1995 National Constitution. 
In its objective x, the constitution states that, ‘the state shall take all the 
necessary steps to involve the people in the formulation and implementation 
of development plans and programmes that affect them’ (GOU 1995). But 
from the accusations in the community meeting in Paromo parish, it was 
clear that the local communities near the game park had not participated in 
the discussions and decisions that led to the wildlife policy nor the TRSF. 
 According to Hill (2004), the absence of local participation not only 
leads to lack of locally acceptable ways of effectively reducing the human-
wildlife conflict, but it also contributes to feelings of being marginalised 
among local peasants. The Purongo farmers’ call for a dialogue suggests 
that local participation was absent in the formulation of both the TRSF 
and Uganda’s Wildlife Policy in general. This, together with the issues of 
stolen cows during the war, land grabs and mismanagement of PRDP funds, 
suggested that the outcry of being marginalised was more complex than non-
participation in policy, but the focus in this paper is mainly on participation. 
 Anthropologists and other critics of the community participation 
paradigm have often argued that the effectiveness of participation is 
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exaggerated; and that because of elite capture, participation ends up 
perpetuating the existing power relations (disaggregated along gender, age, 
ethnicity, socio-economic status, and education level, among other things) 
and poverty among rural communities instead of empowering them to 
achieve self-reliance (Burkey 1993, Kapoor 2002, Olivier de Sardan 2005, 
Rahnema 1992, Cooke and Kothari 2001). For Mosse (2001), emphasis 
is on the knowledge gap existing within local communities, which affects 
the extent to which certain categories of the community can involve in 
participation; implying that even if local communities were involved, they 
would not participate effectively because of their limited knowledge on 
certain technical issues or details. However, whereas Chambers (1993,1994) 
is aware of these differences and acknowledges the possibility of elite 
capture, he nevertheless posits that participation is possible. In his analysis, 
what is required is change of attitude for development professionals not to 
approach local communities with superiority complex. My experiences in 
Purongo with the local communities these last three years have shown that 
although it can make progress painfully slow, participation is possible and 
necessary for local communities to be empowered into self-reliance. 
 The TRSF (the logic of which is apparently rooted in the concept 
of participation), was introduced as a pilot project in Uganda in 1996 but 
only became fully operational in 2001 (Tumusiime and Vedeld 2012). 
As discussed in the background of this study, the logic of the fund was to 
involve local communities living adjacent to game parks in the management 
of wildlife conservation. However, interviews and group discussions that I 
conducted with members of the local community in the area revealed that 
there had never been any public meeting with park authorities on issues that 
frustrate their efforts to recover their livelihoods after 20 years of war. And 
it made them bitter. Rwot Otto (the clan chief in Pabit Parish) told me about 
the efforts he had made and his frustrations:
I tried as much as possible to discuss this issue (of compensating 
for damages caused by wildlife) with the park authorities here 
but they only point at the policy, saying it does not allow the 
government to pay compensation. I even went to the politicians 
… but no one was willing to help me access the president. But 
I will not give up…
Although a number of scholars, as indicated above, have expressed their 
misgivings about the very possibility of effective communication between 
the different categories of people within the participatory arena, the public 
meetings that I attended, showed a people that knew what they wanted and 
were articulate enough to express their hopes and fears. And I was left with 
no doubt that despite the differences, it was necessary for consensus building 
on issues that affect a people’s wellbeing.     
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Setting the project
When I came to Purongo in 2013, a number of activities related to the 
proposed cultural centre project had already been accomplished. A select 
team of councillors had already conducted a study tour western Uganda to 
learn from their counterparts in Queen Elizabeth and Bwindi national park 
areas who were already operating similar projects. Their findings from the 
tour had resulted in the sub county LG resolution to purchase a 5-acre piece 
of land for the project, setting up two grass thatched huts on the site, and 
constructing a fence to mark the boundaries of the land. 
 I entered the field as one of the two members from Gulu University 
who were co-opted by the ad-hoc project committee set up by the sub county 
LG council to, along with others, constitute the technical team for the project. 
Other members on the team included two from Murchison Falls NP, and 
three from Purongo sub county LG, bringing the total to seven. However, 
considering that I was also doing this as part of participant observation 
for my research on post conflict livelihoods recovery, I decided to declare 
my research interest to the sub county leadership and the project technical 
team members that I was working with. They acknowledged and offered 
to cooperate whenever I needed their attention or participation. I felt quite 
privileged as my position on the team gave me access to the community and 
institutions in the area quite conveniently. 
 The very first day I joined the technical team we received a 
brief from the sub county LG chair. He explained to us our mandate and 
responsibilities; which was followed by a guided tour of the project site in 
Pabit parish. We needed to assess the land already purchased and the facilities 
established on it. Thereafter, we embarked on the programme of sensitising 
local communities in the sub county about the new UWA guidelines for the 
TRSF, and to share with them the need for and relevance of the proposed 
cultural centre project. In our meeting with the sub county LG chair before 
going out to meet the people, he had informed us that our major task was to 
provide technical guidance on how best to manage the project as a profitable 
self-sustaining enterprise while at the same time taking care of the interests 
of the local communities. In that regard, our recommendation was that the 
proposed cultural centre project should be operated as a Community Based 
Organisation (CBO). But we did not want to dictate to the council nor the 
communities whose share of the TRSF money was being used to set it up. 
We needed to share our views and recommendations on these issues with the 
communities and to come out with resolutions on priorities and action points 
without imposing our ideas on them (cf. Chambers’ 1993). We therefore 
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advised the councillors that we would need to conduct a tour of the entire 
sub county along the LG structures. In Uganda’s LG structure, the lowest 
political level of elective leadership is the village, followed by the parish, 
the sub county and the district, in that order. On the other hand, the parish 
is currently the basic level of public administration and it is followed by the 
sub county and the district in that order (GOU 1995, Saito 1998, Villadsen 
and Lubanga 1996). While political structures are headed by chairpersons, 
administrative structures are headed by paid chiefs. 
 Although we had wanted to hold as many meetings as possible 
to ensure we reached everybody, this was not possible due to logistical 
constraints. However, after a long discussion, we decided on one meeting in 
each parish. Apparently, each parish had a specific place designated for such 
meetings. Herein lay the very first challenge of the participatory paradigm. Did 
we reach everybody in each parish? Did we even reach the most vulnerable? 
Without actual statistics of all the households in each parish, it was not easy to 
say what percentages of the population attended the meetings. But one thing 
was for sure. By the end of the five meetings with local communities, we had 
not only explained and clarified the new guidelines comprehensively, but we 
had also managed to get support for the proposed cultural centre project in 
each of the five parishes. We applied a dialogical approach (Freire 1972) in 
which validity claims rather than power claims were used to reach consensus 
(Sullivan 2012). In the end, it was agreed that, in line with the guidelines, 
each parish should elect 9 representatives to the Parish Project Committee 
and 5 to the Parish Procurement Committee. The communities also offered 
their share of the TRSF to be used in setting up the project as a joint venture 
that would belong to all the parishes of the sub county. They also agreed to 
participate in the project through the committees that were to be set up; and 
by contributing Acholi cultural symbols and trophies to the museum that was 
to be part of the project. Recommendations drawn from the parish meetings 
were later presented to the sub county council that discussed them and made 
resolutions on that basis. Finally, an Interim Project Committee (IPC) was 
formed with the short-lived mandate of working closely with the technical 
team to set up the project in the shortest time possible. The IPC was therefore 
expected to set up the CBO and its structures before going into the actual 
project itself. In more practical terms, this meant writing the constitution and 
registering the organisation at the district headquarters in Anaka town, about 
10 km away. 
THE POWER GAME SETS IN
With the challenging tasks of operationalising the CBO hanging over their 
heads, IPC members wasted no time. As soon as they were constituted they 
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made a work plan that was to guide their activities; but soon things started 
to drag. After three years they were yet to register the organisation. During 
that period, I observed there was a silent power struggle between the sub 
county LG and the IPC. It was clear the latter looked at the proposed project 
as their brainchild and wanted to have the upper hand. The IPC, on the other 
hand, considered itself the legitimate institution to plan and implement the 
project, having been elected by the grassroots communities in their parishes. 
Thus, right from the beginning, the two went on a collision course. It all 
started when the IPC rejected the proposal of the sub county LG leaders to 
include retired civil servants and elders on the IPC. The LG had invited five 
elders to attend the first IPC session at which its executive committee was 
to be elected and work plan made. But the majority of elected members of 
the IPC rejected the idea. ‘UWA guidelines do not mention elders among the 
categories to constitute grassroots committees’, said the interim chairman 
shortly after his election to the post.  
 At first we did not understand why scheduled IPC meetings always 
delayed to take off. I remember how IPC meetings often delayed to start for 
almost two hours. Sometimes we simply rescheduled them to the afternoon 
or the following day because quorum had not been realised. When late 
coming and absenteeism persisted, we put it for discussion in one of the 
meetings. That is when the community representatives told us how the LG 
had refused to finance the activities of IPC claiming there was no money. 
Neither the IPC chair nor any of his committee members was allowed to 
attend LG meetings to present their case. When we asked the councillors 
on the technical team why IPC members could not be allowed to present 
their issues to the LG Executive, the answer was that the law did not allow 
non-members of the executive and management to attend such meetings. 
In principle, this meant that the official channel of communication and 
collaboration between IPC and LG had been blocked, yet if any positive 
change was to be achieved, there was need for the two institutions to interact 
and plan together (Bollig 2016). In fact, at this point there was another point 
of conflict. Whereas IPC members preferred the proposed project to be 
operated directly by the community through the CBO that was being formed, 
LG officials wanted it to be contracted out. The gap was getting wider. As 
the LG tightened the squeeze further, members of the IPC found it difficult 
even to attend meetings for lack of facilitation. Eventually some of them 
stopped coming. But sub county authorities continued to make resolutions 
on the proposed project without input from the IPC or the technical team. In 
the last quarter of 2014, the LG contracted a construction company to put up 
two semi-permanent structures, and in April, 2015, the project was launched. 
Members of the IPC still hoped to follow the original plan whereby members 
of the local community were to participate both directly and indirectly. But 
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one year after the launch, there were still no funds released to the IPC, and 
not even a single sub-committee had been formed. All indications were that 
the redundant facility was wasting away. 
 The failure of the project to take off suggested a number of 
practical challenges to the participation paradigm. Interviews with individual 
members of the LG showed that council felt humiliated when IPC rejected 
the elders it had invited. The subsequent ‘lock out’ of the IPC was therefore 
‘a punishment a parent gives to a wayward child’. However, in spite of 
being the financiers of the project, and the setters of the conditions IPC was 
purporting to follow, park officials who knew about the impasse appeared 
to have no capacity to ‘influence’ the LG to do the right thing. Judging 
from the zeal with which they had supported the cultural centre project, I 
had concluded that park officials wanted it to succeed. It was expected to 
provide a forum for collaboration and participation between the park and 
the community; and also a shield of wildlife protection from poachers and 
other dangers. More tourists would mean more revenue to the game park; but 
also more customers for the cultural centre, more income into the project, 
and into the community directly through cultural tourism, sale of foods, 
crafts and artefacts. The power struggle between LG and IPC was therefore 
neither good for wildlife conservation nor for post conflict community 
livelihoods recovery. Yet park officers could not intervene to save the IPC 
or the project. The conflict, therefore, underlined the importance of a wider 
mode of participation and collaboration not only vertically within sectors 
but also horizontally across sectors to neutralise power struggles and other 
bottlenecks within and between institutions (both local and national) that 
often frustrate efforts to transform local communities (Saito 2003). 
THE LOUD SILENCE
The government’s continued silence about dialogue on compensation became 
even louder when the cultural centre project stagnated, as the people became 
more frustrated by crop losses. “When elephants come …”, is therefore, a 
narrative of the Purongo local community that presents their frustrations over 
problem animals as they try to reconstruct their livelihoods after 20 years 
of war. Although there were other challenges that affected the agricultural 
livelihoods in Purongo, ‘the elephant’ (as a symbol of wildlife destruction) 
was considered to be the major one. When I asked people in focus groups 
to rank the major impediments to agriculture, problem animals were ranked 
higher than erratic rains and drought conditions, yet these two were also 
a big threat to agro-production in Acholi sub region and beyond. Lack of 
inputs, lack of modern farming skills, unpredictable markets and low prices, 
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were also mentioned as areas where the state had not done enough in spite of 
Northern Social Action Fund (NUSAF) and National Agricultural Advisory 
Services (NAADS) projects. In my interaction with the Parish Chief of Pabit 
a few days after the focus groups, he agreed with the ranking of focus groups 
on the elephant problem. He narrated to me how in the long rains of 2015 he 
had himself fallen victim. He cultivated 5 acres of rice from which he had 
expected to raise the equivalent of US $1.500; but elephants just ate it all 
up. In the end he was barely able to cover his production costs. With a lot of 
bitterness, he narrated the scenario in general terms as follows: 
When elephants come at night, we phone them (meaning, 
park warders) to come to our rescue but they don’t respond. 
When you are lucky and they answer the phone, they tell you 
they don’t have transport. … But even when they say they 
are coming, they take so long that by the time they arrive, the 
animals will have done so much damage and probably moved 
on. You know how an elephant does not move alone and 
you know how big they can be. When they descend on your 
gardens, oh my dear, you don’t want to witness it! So, I am just 
there. I don’t even know what to do next.
The chief’s narrative was only representative. Others were even more 
emotional with wider impacts on education, health and general welfare of the 
families concerned. The common factor among them all was ‘the elephant’. 
Focus groups said they could not understand why the government refused 
to listen to its own citizens’ outcry but instead chose to show more concern 
for the welfare of wild animals even when the president had always said 
that ‘power belongs to the people’. They recommended that government 
should be responsive to the people’s outcry and revise the wildlife policy 
to accommodate compensation alongside the TRSF, but also create a 
platform for coordination and continuous engagement between UWA and the 
communities. They even pointed out that most of those affected by problem 
animals were peasant farmers who could not afford sophisticated farming 
techniques but who were nevertheless important citizens like everybody else. 
Otherwise, the current structure where the affected communities remain on 
the margins when major decisions are taken, yet such decisions have such a 
profound effect on their livelihoods, was no longer tenable under the era of 
liberalised economic systems and decentralised governance. 
CONCLUSION
Although there was very little by way of community participation in 
formulation and implementation of the wildlife policy in Uganda, the 
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TRSF was nevertheless viewed as a good scheme aimed at giving back 
to the community. By investing the TRSF money in community projects 
such as Purongo Seed Secondary School and Acholi culture and tourism 
centre, Purongo sub county LG tried to distribute its benefits to as wide a 
community as possible. Hence, although the challenges of problem animals 
still remained, communities were expected to feel involved in wildlife 
conservation as it was the source of the fund that gave them such projects. 
The logic behind the cultural centre project even went further. The fact that 
the project would need a continuous flow of tourists, most of whom would 
be primarily visiting the park, meant that the community would actively 
participate in efforts to ensure that wildlife was protected from poachers 
and any other dangers. But the power relations that erupted between the 
sub county LG and IPC turned the project into a forum for conflict rather 
than community transformation through positive engagement between park 
authorities and the community. Hopes for community empowerment through 
livelihood skills and capabilities, and the cultural awakening that were to 
be gained through the project have all been frustrated. Instead, there is 
continued wastage as the project buildings on which so much resources were 
spent remain in disuse. The danger is that once the marginality and exclusion 
played out at the macro level is replicated at the micro level as was being 
played out in Purongo between the sub county LG and IPC, it could lead to 
institutional crises and public disorder.
References
Bollig, Michael (2016), Towards an Arid Eden? Boundary-making, 
governance and benefit sharing and the political ecology of the 
new commons of Kunene Region, Northern Namibia, International 
Journal of the Commons, Vol. 10, no 2, pp.771–799 
Chambers, Robert, (1993), Challenging the professions; Frontiers for rural 
development, London: Intermediate Technology Publications
Chambers, Robert, (1994), Participatory rural appraisal (PRA): Challenges, 
potentials and paradigm, World Development, Vol. 22, No. 10, 
pp1437-1454
Cornwall, Andrea, (2000), Making a difference? Gender and participatory 
development, Institute of Development Studies, Paper 378: 
ISBN 1 85864 337 6. www.participatorymethods.org/sites/
participatorymethods.org/Dp378.pdf
Gersony, Robert (1997), The anguish of Northern Uganda; Results of field 
based research of the civil conflict in northern Uganda, Kampala: 
USAID 
Hill Catherine M., (2000), Conflict of interest between people and baboons: 
Crop raiding in Uganda, International Journal of Primatology, Vol 
21. No.2 pp 299-315
178
JGD Vol. 12. Issue 2, December 2016   
Hill Catherine M., (2004) Farmers’ perspectives of conflict at the wildlife-
agriculture boundary: Some lessons learnt from African subsistence 
farmers, Human Dimensions of Wildlife, 9: 279-286
IDMC (2009) Uganda Overviews: Returns outpace recovery planning. 
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre; www.internal-
displacement.org accessed 21.9.2010 at 17:47 
KPMG Uganda Budget Brief 2014: www.kpmg.com/eastafrica, accessed 
20.5.2016
Lamarque F., J. Anderson, R. Fergusson, M. Lagrange, Y. Osei-Owusu, 
L. Bakker, (2009) Human-wildlife conflict in Africa Causes, 
consequences and Smanagement strategies, FAO Forestry Paper 
157. Rome: FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF 
THE UNITED NATIONS)
Lawino, S. (2012). Amuru women undress before Madhvani boss. Daily 
Monitor Online, Posted Sat. Apr 21, 2012. Retrieved from 
http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/-/688334/1390386/-/ 
avks9ez/-/index.html.
Michell, J. Clyde, (2006), ‘Case and situation analysis’, in Evens, TMS 
and Don Hendelman (eds), The Manchester School, Practice and 
ethnographic praxis in anthropology, New York: Berghahn Books
Mikkelsen, Britha (2005), Methods for development work and research; A 
new guide for practitioners, New Delhi, Sage Publications
Mugenda, Olive M. and Abel G Mugenda, (2003) Research Methods; 
Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches, Nairobi, Acts Press
Nazneen Kanji (2004), Reflections on gender and participatory development. 
Participatory Learning and Action, 50: p53-62 [International 
Institute for Environment and Development]
New Vision, 3 May 2009. http://allafrica.com/stories/200905040338.html.
Olivier de Sardan, Jean-Pierre (2005), Anthropology and development; 
Understanding contemporary social change, London, Zed Books
Sullivan, Paul, (2012), Qualitative data analysis using a dislaogical approach, 
London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, Singapore: Sage Publications 
Tumusiime DM. and Paul Vedeld (2012), False promise or false premise? 
Using tourism revenue sharing to promote conservation and poverty 
reduction in Uganda, Conservation and society, 10 (1) 15-28
UNWTO (2012), United Nations World Tourism Organisation Report 2012,
http://www2.unwto.org/publication/unwto-annual-report-2012
Villadsen, Soren and Francis Lubanga (1996), Democratice decentralisation 
in Uganda; A new approach to local governance, Kampala: Fountain 
Publishers 
